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"SO LONG AS OUR SYSTEM SHALL EXIST":
MYTH, HISTORY, AND THE NEW FEDERALISM
Paul D. Moreno*
ABSTRACT
This article provides the broad historical context necessary to understand
contemporary developments in federalism doctrine. It shows that dual federalism
has a long and varied history and that federalism is a content-neutral principle to
which both sides in major political contests have appealed. It seeks to show that the
predominant perspective on federalism today - that it is an inherently conservative
principle - is the result of historical misperception. This article reinterprets the
history of American federalism in light of recent historical scholarship concerning
various periods: principally the country's founding; slavery, the Civil War, and
Reconstruction; the late nineteenth-century social question; and the Progressive Era.
INTRODUCTION
Since 1976, and especially in the last few Supreme Court terms, legal scholars
have detected a "new federalism." Several decisions suggest that Congress can no
longer exercise virtually unlimited control over the nation's socioeconomic life from
its power to "regulate commerce among the States."' These decisions point toward
a revival of the constitutional principle of "dual federalism," in which both federal
and state governments enjoy sovereign powers.2
From the ratification of the Constitution until the New Deal, a consensus held that
the national government was one of limited, enumerated powers and that the states
reserved the vast bulk of ordinary government functions. The Tenth Amendment
stated this principle, that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
* William & Bernice Grewcock Chair in the American Constitution, Hillsdale College;
Fellow, James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, Princeton University;
B.A. and M.A., State University of New York at Albany; Ph.D., University of Maryland.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2 Edward S. Corwin coined the phrase "dual federalism." Note, "Dual Federalism"
Today, 38 COLuM. L. REV. 142, 142 n. 1 (1938). The term "new federalism" seems to have
originated in the Nixon administration's greater use of revenue-sharing. See Jana L. Tibben,
Comment, Family Leave Policies Trump States' Rights: Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs and Its Impact on Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 37 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 599, 603 n.21 (2004).
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or to the people."3 In the early years of the twentieth century, the "progressive era,"
this dual system began to erode as Congress began to exercise local or "police
powers" - the general power to legislate on matters concerning the safety, health,
welfare, and morals of the people.4 The Supreme Court and the American people
were fundamentally ambivalent about this development, favoring greater national
power but deeply divided about how far it should go.5 The economic crisis of the
Great Depression and political realignment of the New Deal swept that ambivalence
away.6 After 1937, the Supreme Court no longer struck down acts of Congress
regulating economic activity as beyond the delegated powers of the Constitution.7
The Court and informed public opinion accepted all regulation as coming under
Congress's power "to regulate commerce among the States."
Suddenly, in 1976, the Court reopened the federal question. In National League
of Cities v. Usery,8 it held that Congress could not impose the Fair Labor Standards
Act on state employees. 9 To do so limited an "attribute[] of sovereignty attaching to
every state government."' Ten years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority," the Court overturned National League of Cities and declared that
it would no longer act as the umpire in settling federal-state boundary disputes, leaving
such conflicts to the political branches. 2 After another decade, the Court effectively
overruled Garcia, striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act.'3 Congress could
3 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
4 Black's Law Dictionary defines "police power" as "[t]he inherent and plenary power
of a sovereign to make all laws necessary and proper to preserve the public security, order,
health, morality, and justice." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (7th ed. 1999). See also
Robert P. George, Forum on Public Morality: The Concept of Public Morality, 45 AM. J.
JLuRis. 17, 20 (2000).
See infra notes 236-37.
6 See infra notes 237-44.
7 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 147 (1938) (holding that the
power to regulate commerce includes the power to prohibit the shipment of articles of
commerce, even where the "motive or... consequence [of such prohibition] is to restrict the
use of articles of commerce within the states of destination," and that the power to regulate
commerce is circumscribed only by limitations in the Constitution). The Court determined
that "regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of
such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis." Id. at
152. The Court noted that this "presumption of constitutionality" may have less force "when
legislation appears... to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution." Id. at 152 n.4.
8 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
9Id.
o Id. at 845.
" 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
12 Id.
"3 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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not claim that the criminalization of the possession of a firearm within one thousand
feet of a school was a regulation of commerce among the states.1 4 Two years later,
the Court held that Congress could not compel state officers to help enforce the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.1 In 2000, the Court struck down the
Violence Against Women Act on similar grounds. 6 "Indeed, we can think of no
better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and
vindication of its victims," the court declared. 7
All of these decisions were 5-4, and nobody knows what they may amount to.18
It is far too early to predict the future or to sort out profitably the intricate legal
distinctions of this tumultuous and closely divided set of cases. None of the pro-
federalism decisions has dealt with congressional regulation of private sector
economic activity, which was the chief source of conflict in the progressive era.
Rather, these decisions deal only with congressional regulations that affect states in
their sovereign capacity. Thus, the Court may hold that the Fair Labor Standards
Act does not apply to state employees, but it is far from striking down the entire act
on dual-federalist grounds. "Although I might be willing to return to the original
understanding," Justice Thomas said in Lopez, "I recognize that many believe that
it is too late in the day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60
years. Considerations of stare decisis and reliance interests may convince us that
we cannot wipe the slate clean.' 9
Nevertheless, opponents describe these decisions as revolutionary. Dissenting
in one case, Justice William Brennan claimed, "The portent of such a sweeping
holding is so ominous for our constitutional jurisprudence as to. leave one incredu-
lous."2 Harvard Law School professor Laurence Tribe described the new federal-
ism decisions as "scary. They treat states' rights in a truly exaggerated way, harking
back to what the country looked like before the [C]ivil [W]ar and, in many ways,
even before the adoption of the [C]onstitution."'" Tribe subsequently told a Senate
committee that "[t]he current Court's effort to aggrandize itself vis-A-vis the demo-
cratically elected legislature has upset the traditional institutional balance between
14 Id. Congress neglected to claim in its legislative findings that the statute had anything
to do with commerce. Id. at 562.
'5 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
16 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
17 Id. at 618.
18 The Court anticipated these major federalism decisions in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452 (1991), andNew Yorkv. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and has also expanded
state immunity from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996). But most attention has focused on the Commerce Clause decisions,
which have the greatest potential impact of the new federalism decisions.
'9 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 601 n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring).
20 Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 875 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21 Activism in Different Robes, ECONOMIST, July 3, 1999, at 22.
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the political and judicial branches, and may threaten our system of democracy
itself."22 Another law professor described the new federalism decisions as "'part of
the Burger Court's holy war against the lingering forces of bankrupt liberalism and
big government. It is not an exaggeration to compare [them] to the opening salvo
in a war."' 23 Two prominent historians note that the new federalism decisions are
"'strained, even silly,"' 24 and claim that "the members of the majority conceive of
themselves as the triumphant perpetrators of a conservative coup." 25
Why is the reaction so out of proportion to the cause? The explanation is partly
partisan, since the devolution of power from Washington to the states is a cause
championed today most often by the right. The conservative wing of the Court
(particularly Justices Thomas and Scalia, as well as the late Chief Justice Rehnquist)
has advanced the new federalist decisions. Newt Gingrich highlighted devolution
in the 1994 "Contract with America,, 26 and Republican presidential candidate
Robert Dole frequently referred to the Tenth Amendment in his 1996 campaign.27
At a deeper level, the opponents of the new federalism fear the reopening of the
constitutional and historical questions that they believe had been laid to rest in the
New Deal years. The Court has lifted the veil on the New Deal's weak constitu-
tional foundations. It has provoked fears that the Court is inviting back a
"Constitution-in-exile" 2 by exposing the lack of formal foundation for the New
Deal constitutional "moment., 29 Liberals have reason to fear that the New Deal
constitutional revolution, done informally and politically, can be undone informally
and politically.
The new federalism decisions have called into question the progressive histo-
riography that undergirds New Deal constitutional history. Opponents of the new
federalism vilify states rights and the Tenth Amendment by associating them with
slavery, segregation, and child labor.3" Thus, the dean of New Deal historians claims,
22 Memorandum from Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch. 3 (Apr.
5, 2001), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldside/te062601 triApndx.htm.
23 William E. Leuchtenburg, The Tenth Amendment over Two Centuries: More than a
Truism, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 61 (Mark R. Killenbeck ed.,
2002) (quoting J.M. Balkin, Ideology and Counter-Ideology from Lochner to Garcia, 54
UMKC L. REv. 175, 194 (1986)).
24 Activism in Different Robes, supra note 21, at 23 (quoting Jack N. Rakove, historian
at Stanford University).
25 Leuchtenburg, supra note 23, at 97.
26 See Peter A. Lauricella, The Real "Contract with America ": The Original Intent of the
Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1377, 1377 (1997).
27 Roger Pilon, Editorial, A Matter for the States, WASH. POST, June 18, 1996, at A13.
28 Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 18 REGULATION 83, 84 (1995) (book
review).
29 Bruce Ackerman, A Generation ofBetrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1519, 1522 (1997).
Ackerman calls a "moment" the informal, de facto amendment of the Constitution that took
place in the New Deal. Id.
3 See Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zietlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress and
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"[a]lone of the 10 amendments that, by some reckonings, the Bill of Rights comprises,
the Tenth Amendment has a sordid past."'" Another scholar notes, "The defense of
the states seemed to have too many reactionary and racist overtones."32 Recently, a
Bush administration attorney tried to discredit Californians trying to widen medical
use of marijuana beyond federal law by comparing them to segregationists.33 But this
"black legend" interpretation of dual federalism is a gross historical distortion.
This article attempts to show how the history of federalism has been manipulated
by defenders of unlimited national power. It will take into account the principal con-
stitutional developments that have shaped federalist doctrine -judicial review and
the Commerce Clause. It will show that, over two centuries, the federal principle has
been content-neutral and has served a wide variety of causes, for left and right alike.
I. FEDERALISM AND THE FOUNDING
Federalism provided the most important device of constitutional government
for the framers of the Constitution. By "constitutional" government, the framers
meant effective but limited government. The chief task facing the framers of the
Constitution was to provide a government that was more powerful than the Articles
of Confederation, but not so powerful that it extinguished the liberties of the people.
As Lincoln put it, "Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties
of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?"34 Thus, the relative
powers of the national and state governments produced more discussion and debate
than any other topic at the Philadelphia Convention and in state ratifying conventions.
The nationalists or consolidationists - those, like James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton, who came to call themselves "Federalists" - had to accept in the "Great
Compromise" a divided sovereignty or "compound republic."35 As Madison put it
in The Federalist, "In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by
the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion
allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people."36 Madison might have called it a "triple
security," for the states themselves, from their earliest colonial origins, had federal
Rights of Belonging, 73 U. CN. L. REv. 1347, 1369-70 (2005) (criticizing the Rehnquist
Federalism Revolution and noting that states' rights was the rallying cry of pro-slavery and
segregationist forces).
3' Leuchtenburg, supra note 23, at 42 (footnote omitted).
32 Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence ofFederalism
after Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 419.
3' Bob Egelko, Federal Lawyer Likens Pot Law to Civil Rights: Segregationists Tried to
'Cherry Pick' the Rules, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 10, 2003, at A25.
34 Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, in SELECTED WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 129 (T. Harry Williams ed., Hendricks House, 1980).
35 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
36 Id.
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systems of their own, with most political activity taking place in town and county
subdivisions. Emphasizing the point that both the national and state governments
exercised sovereign powers, Madison wrote, "The proposed Constitution . . . is,
in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both."37
Stressing the expectation that most power would remain at the local level, he wrote
that "[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are nu-
merous and indefinite., 38 The Tenth Amendment would repeat these assertions.
The Anti-federalists remained unconvinced that these guarantees would prevent
the consolidation of national power and the evisceration of the states. Yet, despite
the intense debate between Federalists and Anti-federalists, they shared many funda-
mental values. The Anti-federalists appreciated the need for a stronger national gov-
ernment, and the Federalists shared a concern for preserving local government. It
is important to recognize, as political scientist Herbert Storing put it, "what the
Antifederalists werefor. 39
Federalists and Anti-federalists alike believed that republican government de-
pended on individual self-government. This belief went back to the classical idea
that the character of the regime depended on the character of the soul, and the Judeo-
Christian idea that internal and voluntary adherence to God's law was the basis of
right rule. Republican governments depended on virtue, a willingness to sacrifice
one's private interests for the good of the. commonwealth, or res publica.4" This
kind of government could only succeed in a relatively small ambit.41
In republican theory, "liberty" had a local and corporate connotation for the
founding generation, one that persisted, even as it weakened, into the twentieth
century.42 As one historian describes it, colonial Americans defined liberty as "vol-
untary submission to a life of righteousness that accorded with objective moral stan-
dards as understood by family, by congregation, and by local communal institutions.
37 THEFEDERALISTNO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 35, at 246. See also CHRISTOPHER
COLLIER, ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL: FAMILY, FRIENDS, AND PROVINCIAL INTERESTS IN THE
CREATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 110- 11 (2063) (discussing Anti-federalist opposition to the
Constitution).
38 THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison), supra note 35, at 292.
39 HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981).
40 Id. at 20.
41 Id. at 15-20. Storing explains that the Anti-federalists believed only small republics
could successfully secure individual liberties. Id. at 15. This was, in part, because repub-
licanism required civic virtue, and civic virtue thrives only in small republics. Id. at 20. Small
republics "daily remind[] each man of the benefits derived from and the duties owed to his
little community." Id.
42 1 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL.,.THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOP-
MENT 508-10 (7th ed., 1991)..
41 BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 4 (1994).
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True freedom involved self-imposed restraint," and the state had the obligation to
help individuals to control themselves. Institutions, principally families, churches, and
juries, enforced communal norms.4" American individualism could flourish and keep
from becoming destructive due to a high level of group cohesion. Americans until
recently evinced high degrees of"spontaneous sociability";' America possessed a high
level of social "trust.'
47
Alexis de Tocqueville made some of the keenest observations on the importance
of local self-government. "[T]he strength of free peoples resides in the local
community. Local institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to science;
they put it within the people's reach," he said. "They teach people to appreciate its
peaceful enjoyment and accustom them to make use of it. Without local institutions
a nation may give itself a free government, but it has not got the spirit of liberty."'
De Tocqueville noted that divided sovereignty was impossible in theory and feared
the centrifugal force of disunion more than the centripetal force of consolidation.49
"Clearly here we have not a federal government but an incomplete national govern-
ment," he observed. 50 But de Tocqueville distinguished between the necessity of
centralized government and the desirability of decentralized administration. Admin-
istrative centralization would mean the end of freedom in America, de Tocqueville
noted; containment of power within the limited spheres of federalism was essential.5
Historians in the 1960s and 1970s emphasized and exaggerated the "civic repub-
lican" element in the founding period.52 And, although historians have given greater
recognition to Biblical and Judeo-Christian themes in the period, it is still too much
to say that the independence movement was principally a republican or a millennial
one, or a combination of both - a drive to create a "Christian Sparta," as Sam
44 Id. at 42.
41 Id. at 99, 153, 209-11, 260.
46 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY
27, 29 (1995). Fukuyama describes "spontaneous sociability" as social cooperation outside
the family and outside structures established by government. Id. at 27. While Americans
have been "antistatist" from the time of the founding, they have not been individualistic in
an antisocial sense. Id. at 29. Instead, America "has always possessed a rich network of
voluntary associations and community structures to which individuals have subordinated
their narrow interests." Id. After all, "strong community can emerge in the absence of a
strong state." Id.
47 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 511 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Anchor 1969); FUKUYAMA, supra note 46, at 10-11. Fukuyama notes that
American sociability has declined "rather dramatically over the past couple of generations."
Id. at 10.
48 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 47, at 62-63.
41 Id. at 118, 167, 384.
50 Id. at 157.
SI Id. at 88, 262, 287.
52 Robert Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence ofan Understanding
of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM & MARY Q. 49 (1972).
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Adams put it.53 Liberal individualism predominated, and the Anti-federalists as
much as Federalists wanted to protect individual rights. 4 At the same time, all
Americans shared a profound concern for local self-government 5 - either as a self-
conscious and articulated belief that the states were the protectors and incubators of
institutions of local liberty, or as an unstated assumption of their importance. The
Anti-federalist solicitude for the state governments was clear enough, and often re-
flected nothing more than a desire to preserve their own prestige and status in office.
But below the states lay institutions even more intimately involved with local liberty
- the churches, militia, juries, and families in every part of America. 6
The Anti-federalists demanded above all a Bill of Rights to protect these insti-
tutions. Historians in the last generation have cleared away the popular miscon-
ception that the Bill of Rights was intended to protect individual rights. Rather, the
Bill of Rights reflected federalism, a desire to preserve state power against national
encroachment.57 Thus, the First Amendment intended as much to protect the estab-
lished churches of New England states against national interference as it did to
protect disestablishment in Virginia. The Second Amendment (setting aside the
question of whether the right to bear arms was considered a collective or individual
right) primarily meant to preserve state and local control of militias. Several amend-
ments concern thej ury, another institution that was vitally important in the eighteenth
century. These institutions, even more than the state legislatures, provided the vital
link between citizen and government. They inculcated the principles of republican
government.
The family provided even more fundamental grounding in self-government than
town,jury, church, and militia. Eighteenth-century Americans could hardly have imag-
ined the way that the family has become devalued and marginalized in the twentieth
century. In many ways the recent "family values" campaign reflects an explicit return
to a taken-for-granted idea that families are the principal inculcators of all values.
The family was a natural institution, and basically religious, for religious principles
suffused local institutions. The founders assumed that a republic certainly could not
51 JAMES H. HUTSON, FORGOTTEN FEATURES OF THE FOUNDING: THE RECOVERY OF
RELIGIOUS THEMES IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2003); SHAIN, supra note 43, at 39.
54 STORING, supra note 39, at 83 n.7 (arguing that the requirements of civic virtue and
the common good were not ends in themselves, but rather were instrumental in securing
individual liberty); see also KELLY ET AL., supra note 42, at 67.
55 See DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKwAYS IN AMERICA
827 (1989).
" See Wilfred M. McClay, The Soul of Man Under Federalism, 64 FIRST THINGS 21
(June/July 1996).
11 WILLIAM E. NELSON & ROBERT C. PALMER, LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY: CONSTITuTIoN
AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 105-17(1987); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill
of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991); John Choon Yoo, Federalism and
Judicial Review, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 131, supra note 23,
at 169.
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function without the churches, communities, and families that all Americans be-
longed to, and all of these rested on a common moral and religious foundation. As
John Adams put it, "Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious
people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.""8 Washington
made a similar point in his Farewell Address: republican government depended on
virtue and morality, which in turn depended on religion. 9
Religious assumptions thus undergirded the local policing-of morals. States and
towns suppressed or regulated divorce, adultery, sodomy, gambling, drinking, and
a host of other behaviors, on the assumption that the community needed to help
individuals to control themselves. Though all states had done away with established
churches by the 1830s, a broadly Protestant de facto establishment existed. "Religion,
which never intervenes directly in the government of American society, should
therefore be considered as the first of their political institutions," de Tocqueville
observed. 0 Religious promotion of individual self-government became even more
necessary as society became more democratic and as traditional, external controls
were relaxed.6
The collapse of dual federalism in the twentieth century took place by a two-part
process. Most legal scholars have only paid attention to the first part, in which the
Supreme Court allowed Congress virtually unlimited power to regulate the national
economy under the commerce clause - giving Congress, in the language of the
Tenth Amendment, "powers not delegated." The second part came largely in the
1960s by way of the application (known as "incorporation") of the Bill of Rights
to the states. Here the Court struck down traditional state and local regulation of
morals, denying to the states powers not prohibited by the Constitution to them.
Thus, a vital element of the founders' system, in which the habit of republican self-
government was exercised by local majorities, was considerably weakened.
The history of federalism during and after the writing of the Constitution dis-
plays the widely shared cultural and political consensus regarding the importance
of local self-government. The Great Compromise, by which the states were repre-
sented as states in the upper house of the national legislature,62 presented only the
most obvious way in which the Constitution protected states in their corporate
identity. Almost every part of the Constitution had some federal aspect. The Senate
58 Letter from John Adams to Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of the
Militia ofMassachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798), in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 228,229 (Charles
Francis Adams ed., 1854).
'9 Farewell Address, Sept. 19, 1796, in GEORGE WASHINGTON: ACOLLECTION 522 (W.B.
Allen ed., 1988).
60 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 47, at 292.
61 Id. at 292-94.
62 See Miranda Oshige McGowan, American Democracy: A Model Oxymoron, or Who
Knew the Constitution EnshrinedAffirmativeActionfor States?, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 631,
642 (2004) (book review).
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had special powers to ratify treaties and confirm executive appointments.63 Since
these included appointments to the federal judiciary, that branch possessed a federal
element. Federalism shaped the executive branch, in that the President was chosen
by an electoral college which was largely controlled by the states and which gave
the less populous states more influence.' Since the founders doubted that many
men would be able to garner a majority of the electoral vote, they expected that most
presidents would be chosen by the House of Representatives which, when it voted
for president, voted on a one-vote-per-state basis.6" The amendment process was
also a federal one, involving the Senate and (almost always) the state legislatures.66
Although the Seventeenth Amendment did away with state legislative choice of
senators in 1913,67 no amendment can deprive a state, without its consent, "of its
equal Suffrage in the Senate""' - the only unamendable part of the Constitution
concerns state sovereignty.
Although the nationalist-Federalists argued against the addition of a Bill of Rights
to the Constitution, they opposed it on the principle that the Constitution already con-
tained enough safeguards for state power.69 Nevertheless, they promised to propose
a set of amendments demanded by many state ratifying conventions.7° Every state had
demanded a clearer statement in what became the Tenth Amendment7 of the principle
of dual sovereignty federalism.72 When James Madison proposed that these provisions
bind the state governments as well as the national government, the Senate revised
them so that they applied only to Congress.73 Madison was able to defeat efforts to
have the amendment state that Congress could not exercise any power not "expressly"
delegated.74 Such language would return the government to its condition under the
Articles of Confederation and exclude incidental or implied powers. Madison noted,
63 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
" If the number of electoral votes were determined strictly on the basis of population,
about two-thirds of the states would lose voting strength.
65 KELLY ET AL., supra note 42, at 97.
66 DAviDE. KYvIG, ExPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,
1776-1995, at 60 (1996).
67 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
61 Id. art. V.
69 James Wilson Speech in the State House Yard, Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167, 167-68 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1976); THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 35, at 511.
70 KELLY ET AL., supra note 42, at 118.
71 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
72 Richard E. Ellis, The Persistence ofAntifederalism After 1789, in BEYOND CONFEDER-
ATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 297 (Richard
Beeman, Stephen Botein, & Edward C. Carter II eds., 1987).
71 See Burt Neuborne, "The House Was Quiet and the World Was Calm: The Reader
Became the Book, "57 VAND. L. REv. 2007, 2083 n. 154 (2004).
71 See Ara B. Gershengorn, Note, Private Party Standing to Raise Tenth Amendment
Commandeering Challenges, 100 COLuM. L. REv. 1065, 1085 (2000).
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"I admit that [the amendment] may be deemed unnecessary; but there can be no harm
in making such a declaration.... " Thus the Tenth Amendment only reinforced the
principle of federalism that pervaded the Constitution. Like the rest of the Bill of
Rights, it changed nothing. It was a simple declaration of fundamental constitu-
tional principle, later described as a "truism."76 We best understand the Tenth
Amendment as "declaratory," expressing or reiterating the structure of the Constitu-
tion.77 In this respect, it can be said to have reinforced Federalism as much as Anti-
federalism.7" It is perhaps not too much to say that the Tenth Amendment was the
79Constitution.
II. NINETEENTH-CENTURY DUAL FEDERALISM
Antebellum constitutional development largely confirmed this dual-federalist
consensus. Although secessionists tried to revive the confederate idea in order to pro-
tect slavery, this did not mean that nationalism was inherently anti-slavery or localism
inherently pro-slavery, or that nationalism was always progressive and localism reac-
tionary. Federalism was a content-neutral principle.
Thus, both parties appealed to local federalism in the early republic. 0 Jefferson
and Madison did so in mobilizing Republican opposition to the Alien and Sedition
Acts. The Tenth Amendment provided the base for the resolutions that condemned
the acts.8 l Progressives overlook this localist defense of civil liberty when condemn-
ing states rights and dual federalism. By the same token, northerners and Federalists
used Tenth Amendment principles to oppose dubious exercises of national power
in the period before the War of 1812.82 Northern governors essentially made a
federalist claim when they resisted the use of their militia for what they regarded as
an unjust war.8 (Several Democratic governors adopted a similar position in op
71 Charles A. Lofgren, The Origins of the Tenth Amendment: History, Sovereignty, and
the Problem of Constitutional Intention, in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 347
(Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1977).
76 United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
77 See id
78 Lofgren, supra note 75, at 349.
" Jefferson made this argument in opposition to the Bank of the United States, but he
usually spoke as if the Amendment contained the crucial adverb, "expressly." See Thomas
Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (1791), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALAND LEGALHISTORY 115 (Melvin I. Urofsky & Paul Finkelman
eds., 2d ed., 2002).
80 See ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, NEW VIEWPOINTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 222
(1922).
8" The Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 16, 1798), in 1 MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 234-38 (Kermit Hall ed., 1992).
82 See, for example, the unsuccessful challenge to the Embargo Act of 1807 in United
States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700).
83 JAMES M. BANNER, JR., To THE HARTFORD CONVENTION: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE
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position to President Reagan's Latin American policy.') And, though they were
excoriated for it, Federalists were resisting a war on the side of a tyrant, Napoleon
Bonaparte. The fact that both sides appealed to the dual federalism demonstrates its
paramount constitutional value."
Early national jurisprudence shows a similar consensus on dual federalism.
Historians recently have pointed out that John Marshall was no founding father of
twentieth-century nationalism and judicial activism, and have emphasized the
continuity between the Marshall and Taney Courts. 6 Marshall's decisions reflect
the mainstream, moderate Federalist and dual sovereignty position. From the earliest
sessions, it was clear that the Supreme Court would adjudicate federal questions.
As Madison put it,
It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between
the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide
is to be established under the general government. But ....
[t]he decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of
the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions
are taken to secure this impartiality.
7
Early court decisions struck down state acts that violated U.S. treaties, and upheld
congressional acts. 8 Adjudication of federalism was thus inherent in the judicial
power. The suggestion that Justice Blackmun made in the Garcia case, that the
Court no longer entertain federalism issues, was historically astounding. 9 As
Marshall put it, "[T]the question respecting the extent of the powers actually
granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, so long as our
system shall exist."9 Whenever the Court upholds an act of Congress, it declares that
Congress is exercising a delegated power, and if it strikes down an act of Congress,
it declares that it is exercising an undelegated power. Whenever the Court upholds
a state act, it declares that the state is exercising a reserved power, and if it strikes
down a state act, it declares that the state enactment is prohibited. In a real sense,
then, every Supreme Court decision is based on the Tenth Amendment.
ORIGINS OF PARTY PoLrIcs IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1789-1815, at 118-21, 339-41 (1969);
KELLY ET AL., supra note 42, at 149; SCHLESINGER, supra note 80, at 224-25; DE TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 47, at 169.
84 See Fred Hiatt, Governors Wary of Sending Guard Troops to Honduras, WASH. POST,
Apr. 5, 1986, at Al.
85 KELLY ET AL., supra note 42, at 145.
86 Id. at 222.
87 THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 35, at 245-46.
18 See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
89 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
90 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
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As a substantive matter, of course, Marshall almost always defended congres-
sional power against state challenges. In his paramount federalism decision,
McCulloch v. Maryland,9 he vindicated the Bank of the United States and stopped
state taxation of it.92 But Marshall always maintained that the Constitution limited
Congress's powers: "This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumer-
ated powers," he noted, saying that this "principle is now universally admitted."93
While he sustained congressional power in this case, he continued,
Should congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures
which are prohibited by the constitution; or should congress,
under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the
accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government; it
would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case
requiring such a decision come before it, to say, that such an act
was not the law of the land.94
But Marshall exercised this painful duty only once,95 for the main challenges to dual
federalism came from state rather than national encroachments.
Latter-day nationalists also regard Marshall as the source of the all-encompassing
commerce clause.96 "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic," Marshall wrote in Gibbons
v. Ogden,97 "but it is something more: it is intercourse."" However, close studies of
the term "commerce" confirm that it was virtually always used with regard to eco-
nomic enterprise, not larger social questions.99 And Marshall conceded power to the
states to exercise powers that affected interstate commerce while Congress remained
"dormant."' ° In the later years of his chiefjusticeship, Marshall gave greater rec-
ognition to state power. He confirmed that the Bill of Rights applied only to the
national government 0' and upheld state power to tax private corporations by a
" 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1891).
92 Id.
9' Id. at 405.
94 Id. at 423.
9' See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
96 FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE
25 (1937); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES' RIGHTS ix-xi,
11-13 (1936).
97 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
98 Id. at 189.
99 Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
101 (2001).
'o Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829).
'o' Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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narrow construction of their charters."0 2 Marshall regarded the taxing power as a
vital element of sovereignty, one that could never be implicitly surrendered.10 3
Thus, Marshall was a mainstream, compound-republic, dual federalist. He
dismissed the exclusive state-sovereignty or state-compact theory of the union,
adumbrated in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and fleshed out by John C.
Calhoun,"° but was never an exclusive popular-sovereignty nationalist. In his view,
the Constitution was the work of both the states and the people: "The government
proceeds directly from the people; is 'ordained and established,' in the name of the
people," he said, in defense of popular sovereignty.0 5 But he immediately went on
to say that "[t]he assent of the states, in their sovereign capacity, is implied, in
calling a convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people."'0 6 This was
largely in keeping with Madison's compound republic view in Federalist No. 39.107
The advent of Jacksonian Democracy may have prompted Marshall to accen-
tuate his concern for reserved state powers, but Jackson's constitutionalism did not
differ fundamentally from Marshall's dual federalism.0 8 It is true that Jackson sided
with state power in nearly every policy dispute of the 1830s, but when push came
to shove during the crisis over South Carolina's attempt to nullify the tariff, Jackson
took the side of the national government." 9 He came down against those like
Calhoun who argued that the Constitution was a compact among sovereign states
only, and who tried to read "expressly" back into the Tenth Amendment."0 It may
be true that Jackson's settlement of the crisis actually empowered the nullifiers, but
he kept alive the principle, as he put it in his proclamation on nullification, that "[t]he
Constitution of the United States... forms a government, not a league."'11 When
Jackson vetoed the bill to renew the charter of the Second Bank of the United States,
he reiterated the point that a strong nation depended on strong states. He wrote:
102 Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830).
103 Id. at 561.
104 From the Fort HillAddress, in THE ESSENTIALCALHOUN: SELECTIONS FROM WRITINGS,
SPEECHES, AND LETTERS 274 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., 1992).
1"5 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403.
106 Id. at 404.
107 THE FEDERALISTNO. 39 (James Madison), supra note 35, at 243. Albeit Madison viewed
the ratification of the Constitution to be "not a national, but a federal act." Id. (emphasis in
original).
10' See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); Providence Bank, 29 U.S. (4
Pet.) 514; Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
109 RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY, STATES' RIGHTS,
AND THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS 142 (1987).
11 See Calhoun Proposes Nullification (1828), in 1 MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 81, at 368-71.
"' 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at
648 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896) [hereinafter PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS].
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Nor is our Government to be maintained or our Union preserved
by invasions of the rights and powers of the several States. In
thus attempting to make our General Government strong we
make it weak. Its true strength consists in leaving individuals
and States as much as possible to themselves.., not in binding
the States more closely to the center, but leaving each to move
unobstructed in its proper orbit. "1
2
The President claimed that it was precisely because he was a nationalist that he was
solicitous of states' rights." 3 Historians, attempting to emphasize Jackson's anti-
bank confederalism, however, usually elide this section of the message." 4
Roger Taney, Marshall's successor as Chief Justice, largely maintained his prede-
cessor's dual federalist view, albeit making more accommodations for state power.
Ultimately, though, he used the power ofjudicial nationalism for the sake of defend-
ing slave states' power.' The confederalist defense of slavery provided the most
prominent element in the black legend of American federalism. Here, too, however,
the association of slavery with states rights was oversimplified.
Of course, the most radical abolitionists were secessionists, the Garrisonians
denouncing the Constitution's union as a "'covenant with death"' and an "'agree-
ment with hell.""' 6 Mainstream anti-slavery activists and Republicans repeatedly
denounced this extreme position." 7 As the sectional crisis advanced, there were
indeed many ways in which anti-slavery advocates made essentially dual federalist
arguments against excessive national power - resisting a takeover of national
government by the slave power."' Northern states objected to the annexation of
Texas by joint resolution and continued to denounce the Mexican War.",9 Fugitive
slave legislation provided the clearest example of anti-slavery states' rights argument.
Salmon P. Chase (as one Tenth Amendment critic notes in passing) and Joshua
Giddings constructed dual federalist arguments against the Fugitive Slave Act and
1,2 Id. at 59. See also Rapaczynski, supra note 32, at 394 ("[I]t is by no means inappro-
priate to speak of a 'failure' of the national government when its operation undermines the
constitutional role of the states.").
"' PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 111, at 590.
14 ELLIS, supra note 109. See, e.g., President Jackson Vetoes the Second Bank of the
United States (1832), in 1 MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra
note 81, at 344 (eliding this section of Jackson's veto message).
"' See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
116 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 228 (1977) (quoting Isaiah 28:18).
"' Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or
Antislavery?, reprinted in FREDERICK DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 389
(Philip S. Foner ed., 1999).
118 SCHLESINGER, supra note 80, at 230.
"' Id. at 230-3 1.
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other pro-slavery uses of national power.12° The abolitionists argued that the
Constitution did not give Congress power to enact a fugitive slave law;12 ' the states
had only an obligation to return fugitive slaves under interstate comity. Nor did
Congress have the power to establish slavery in the territories, nor to use the war
power or the law of nations to promote slave interests. 23 In 1842, the Supreme
Court upheld Congress's fugitive slave power.124 However, in a part of Justice
Story's opinion welcomed by anti-slavery and condemned by pro-slavery partisans,
he maintained that the fugitive slave power was exclusively national and that
Congress could not compel state authorities to help enforce the law. 25 The con-
temporary Supreme Court made the same point in Printz v. United States, 26 that
Congress could not commandeer state officials to help enforce a gun control act.
127
The Fugitive Slave Act turned many moderate northerners into abolitionists and
also led them to embrace localist rather than nationalist constitutional positions.1
28
Northern attempts to nullify the Fugitive Slave Act continued up to the eve of the
Civil War and gave rise to the paradoxical case ofAbleman v. Booth. 29 Here, Chief
Justice Taney defended national power but in a sense nationalized southern slave
law by stopping Wisconsin's attempt to nullify the Fugitive Slave Act. 30 Pro-
slavery advocates rallied to this exercise ofjudicial nationalism, as they had in Dred
Scott.1' Republican critics of Dred Scott, on the other hand, complained that the
decision removed the power of states to confer citizenship. 132 In short, during the
1850s, many southerners became Marshallian judicial nationalists, while many
northerners became Jeffersonian-Jacksonian states-rights advocates.
33
In several other points of conflict regarding slavery, the pro-slavery side might
have tried to use national power. Pro-slavery forces all agreed that abolitionists
should not use the mail to spread anti-slavery opinions, but they divided over whether
120 Leuchtenburg, supra note 23, at 42 n.6.; HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK,
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 111 (1982);
WIECEK, supra note 116, at 209, 214.
121 WIECEK, supra note 116, at 209.
122 Id.
123 See id. at 209, 214.
124 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
125 Id. at 624, 638.
126 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
127 Id.
128 FORREST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUMINIMPERIO, 1776-
1876, at 161 (2000).
129 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
130 See id.
'31 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
132 Rejoinder of Abraham Lincoln, Fourth Joint Debate (Charleston, Sept. 18, 1858), in
THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 162, 198 (Robert W. Johannsen ed., 1965).
133 MCDONALD, supra note 128, at 165-66; SCHLESINGER, supra note 80, at 239; see also
EARL MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTrrUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 3 (1990).
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Congress or the states should enforce censorship.134 Nothing came of either strategy,
and slave states effectively nullified congressional legislation requiring the delivery
of all mail. 35 Southerners also feared that Congress would use the interstate com-
merce power to undermine slavery.'36 Though the Supreme Court ruled that slaves
were not articles of commerce and therefore beyond the commerce power, southerners
demanded that Congress disclaim any power over the interstate slave trade in the
Compromise of 1850.137 Yet, after the commerce power became the great engine of
federal government power in the twentieth century, we could imagine, for example,
Congress prohibiting the shipment of goods made by slave labor across state lines. 3
Or, one could imagine a pro-slavery Congress prohibiting goods made by free labor,
upheld by a pro-slavery Supreme Court in a "third Dred Scott decision." But either
scheme was beyond the imagination of the dual federalist antebellum polity.'39
When secession came, northerners' fears that slave power aggression threatened
their own state and local self-government motivated them to resist it." Northerners
fought for the Union, but especially for a federal union. "What many Americans
admired about their nation was its federal nature, the tradition that kept in local hands
the administration of local problems and that gave the people control over their own
destiny," historian Phillip Paludan notes.' 4' "Local institutions of democratic self-
government were thus a nationalizing force, and devotion to them was the imperative
bond of union.... A potent source of anti-Southern sentiment was thus a widespread
fear that slavery and its proponents endangered the institutions of self-government
of the nation., ' 14 ' Dual federalism was as much the enemy as the ally of slavery and
secession.
Ill. PRESERVING FEDERALISM
Just as the Civil War was fought to save a federal union, so Reconstruction
attempted to restore a federal union. Certainly northern Republicans did not seek
"the Constitution as it is and the Union as it was," the extreme states-rights slogan. 143
134 See KELLY ET AL., supra note 42, at 251.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 250.
13" JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 71 (1988);
see also KELLY ET AL., supra note 42, at 260.
138 One ofthe lawyers made this point in UnitedStates v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). See
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 554 (1956).
139 Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv.
991 (1995).
140 Phillip S. Paludan, The American Civil War Considered as a Crisis in Law and Order,
77 AM. HIST. REV. 1013, 1033 (1972).
141 Id. at 1016.
142 Id. at 1032, 1033.
14" EDWARD J. BLUM, REFORGING THE WHITE REPUBLIC: RACE, RELIGION, AND AMERICAN
NATIONALISM, 1865-1898, at 23 (2005).
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But just as certainly, they did not intend to create a consolidated, centralized
republic.'" Historians of the last generation have emphasized the persistence of
antebellum dual federalism in the Reconstruction period.'45
Republicans framed the Fourteenth Amendment as the centerpiece of Recon-
struction policy. We often forget today that there is more to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment than its first section, which deals with the civil rights of the freedmen, one of
the principal concerns of the framers of the amendment." Republicans also wanted
to restore the Confederate states to the Union, and the other sections of the amendment
were designed to accomplish this. Clearly, the states lost some power under the
Fourteenth Amendment-the power to define citizenship and to discriminate against
citizens - but Republicans expected the states to remain the principal arena of
ordinary law and social policy.147 Congress would assure equal treatment with regard
to certain fundamental rights, but the states would be the normal political and legal
forum. 4 The war had put an end to the extreme state sovereignty interpretation of
the nature of the Union, but retained the dual federalist view. 49 A standard account
concludes:
The Fourteenth Amendment nationalized civil rights, but it did
so in a way that respected traditional federal values. The states
had been the principal regulators of personal liberty and civil
rights, and they would continue to perform that function....
The revolution in federalism that began under wartime exigen-
cies thus stopped at a halfway point. "
As the Supreme Court put it, in a decision regarding the status of the Confederate
states before readmission to Congress, the Constitution assumed "an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States."''
Congress tried to preserve the Constitution's federal structure, and the Supreme
Court showed a similar concern in its interpretation of Reconstruction legislation.
Contemporary critics of the "new federalism" point out that the issue of states'
'" See Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite
Court, 1978 SuP. CT. REV. 39, 40.
14' See id. at 39.
'4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
147 Benedict, supra note 144, at 48.
148 Id.
149 See id.; MALTZ, supra note 133, at 30 (explaining that Republicans were firmly
attached to "the basic structure of American federalism" and that the Union they favored
"was not the Union of the 1980s, in which the federal government plays a dominant role in
the lives ofthe citizenry"); see also Earl Maltz, Reconstruction without Revolution: Republican
Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Hous. L. REv. 221 (1987).
150 KELLY ET AL., supra note 42, at 333-34.
' Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868).
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rights was the basis for the evisceration of the Reconstruction amendments and the
abandonment of the freedmen.'52 But here, too, historians have corrected the legend
that the Court nullified congressional intent, "motivated by the desire to cement the
Union with the blood of the Negro."'5 3 Rather,
When one assesses the Supreme Court's decisions within the
context of the doctrines of dual federalism accepted by most
Americans in the nineteenth century, however, what is remark-
able is the degree to which the Court sustained national authority
to protect rights rather than the degree to which they restricted
it.
54
The Court indeed held that the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which did essentially
what the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would do, was "repugnant to the Tenth Amend-
ment."'55 However, while the Court held that federalism forbade Congress to write
a detailed legal code for the states - i.e., to usurp the state's "police power" - it
did allow Congress to provide remedies in the courts for violations of equal rights. 56
Innkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the States, so
far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to
furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who
in good faith apply for them. If the laws themselves make any un-
just discrimination, amenable to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress has full power to afford a remedy.... '57
It was not until 1896 that the Court entertained this question, and then concluded
that "separate but equal" accommodations were sufficient.'58 Indeed, such judicial
remedies as the Court posited between 1883 and 1896 resurfaced in the 1960s, when
the Court effectively overturned its post-Plessy precedents and essentially made the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 redundant.'59 "In sum, then, the Supreme Court's construc-
152 Leuchtenburg, supra note 23, at 43.
'. Benedict, supra note 144, at 62.
114 Id. at 63.
15 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 15 (1883).
156 Id. at 11.
117 Id. at 25.
5 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896). While lower federal courts had nearly
all accepted a "separate but equal" doctrine before 1896, they often insisted on a substantial
equality that was ignored after Plessy. Stephen J. Riegel, The Persistent Career ofJim Crow:
Lower Federal Courts and the 'Separate but Equal'Doctrine, 1865-1896,28 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 17, 29 (1984).
9 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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tion of congressional power under the constitutional amendments hardly subverted
Republican intent," one historian concludes. 60
A related legend is that, having abandoned the freedmen, the Court then used the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect big business against regulation. Here, too, his-
torians of the last generation have dispelled a myth.' The "laissez-faire court" did
not routinely strike down progressive legislation.'62 In this respect, Plessy was a
typical Gilded Age decision, upholding the police powers of the states 163 - to prevent
racial conflict, in the case of segregation. However, insofar as the judges did use the
amendment to support laissez-faire, federalism was a progressive shield, overlooked
in the later, New Deal historiography. Simply put, progressives wanted to assert
traditional state police powers to control big business. In the 1870s and 1880s, there
were few obstacles to doing so, as the courts gave legislatures a wide berth."6 In the
decades around the turn of the century, the courts began to use the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause to limit property regulation according to doctrines
known as "substantive due process" and "liberty of contract.' ' 65 Progressives at the
time regarded this as a pretext to protect big business, and historians exaggerated the
extent of the phenomenon.'66 Most progressives wanted the federal courts to get out
of the way and to allow the states to act as "laboratories of democracy," a phrase that
was revived in the 1980s and 1990s.167 "It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
160 Benedict, supra note 144, at 77. See also Michael W. McConnell, Toward a More
BalancedHistory ofthe Supreme Court, in THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
AND THE CONSTITUTION 152 (Christopher Wolfe ed., 2004) [hereinafter THAT EMINENT
TRIBUNAL].
161 See MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS FROM THE 1890S TO THE 1930s (2001); Stephen A. Siegel, Comment, The
Revision Thickens, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 631 (2002).
162 Justice Souter adhered to this discredited historical legend in his dissent in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 605 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting), as does McConnell. See
supra note 160, at 152-54.
163 MARK WARREN BAILEY, GUARDIANS OF THE MORAL ORDER: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1860-1910, at 127 (2004); CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY
CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 80-88 (1987); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-
Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitu-
tionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 296-97 (1985); Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality:
The Supreme Court and Protective Legislation in the Progressive Era, 1983 SUP. CT. HIST.
Soc'Y Y.B. 53 (1983).
'" E.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1873).
165 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
166 Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation During the Progressive
Era: A Reevaluation, 72 J. AM. HIST. 63, 63 (1985).
167 See Allison H. Eid, Federalism and Formalism, I 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1191,
1206 (2003).
[Vol. 14:711
"So LONG AS OUR SYSTEM SHALL EXIST"
laboratory," as progressive reformer and Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis
put it, "and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."' 68 It was precisely because state governments were relatively unlimited,
having broad "police powers," that they could promote reform in this fashion.'69
Thus progressives attacked the judicial nationalists who used the Fourteenth
Amendment to trump the states' Tenth Amendment powers. 7 '
For example, in the labor troubles of the Pullman strike, union advocates stood
up for states rights against President Cleveland's use of national power to break the
strike.'71 Illinois Governor Peter Altgeld regarded the strike as an internal state
matter, a position that laissez-faire liberals condemned as neo-Confederate 72
Similarly, to the chagrin of many progressives, federal antitrust laws ended up doing
more to restrain labor unions than business corporations. 173 In the twentieth century,
organized labor came to depend on national legislation for its status. But there
remains a history of "privatism" and use of state power in labor history. 71 Similarly,
it was the most laissez-faire of Justices, Stephen J. Field, who fought the expansion
of federal common law in industrial accident cases (which generally favored em-
ployers), 75 while Justice Brandeis resorted (albeit reluctantly and obliquely) to the
Tenth Amendment to abolish the federal common law.176
Progressives disagreed about many issues, that of federalism included.
Progressivism began at the local, usually city, level, expanded to the states, and
finally came to Washington. While advocates of state power often became enemies
of national progressive reform, many old progressives, like Brandeis, carried a
168 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See also Richard L. McCormick, The Discovery that Business Corrupts Politics: A
Reappraisal of the Origins ofProgressivism, 86 AM. HIST. REV. 247,259 (1981); MCDONALD,
supra note 128, at 232.
169 Martha Derthick & John J. Dinan, Progressivism and Federalism, in PROGRESSIVISM
AND THE NEW DEMOCRACY 81, 92 (Sidney M. Milkis & Jerome Mileur eds., 1999).
170 Id.
171 See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1135,
1163 n.147 (1977).
172 RICHMOND PLANET, July 14, 1894, reprinted in 4 THE BLACK WORKER: A DOCu-
MENTARY HISTORY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 80 (Philip S. Foner & Ronald
L. Lewis eds., 1979).
17' Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEX. L.
REv. 919, 948, 958 (1988).
174 Thomas Clark, Note, Law, Rights, andLocalLabor Politics in California, 1901-1911:
Reflections on Recent Labor Law Historiography, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 325 (1997);
Christopher L. Tomlins, AFL Unions in the 1930s: Their Performance in Historical Perspec-
tive, 65 J. AM. HIST. 1021 (1979).
"' See Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 145 U.S. 368, 391 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
176 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE PoLrICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 178-80 (2000).
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localist distrust of national government into the New Deal period. 177 The principal
argument between the two progressive presidential candidates in 1912 was Wilson's
"new freedom" regard for states' rights versus Roosevelt's "new nationalism."
Though nearly all progressives wanted to curb child labor, for example, Wilsonians
wanted it done at the state level (he changed his mind after his election).' 78 Indeed,
the most common progressive remedy for social ills was "uniform state legislation,"
which they "presented as a way of restructuring the law while maintaining a fed-
eralism that idealized local self-government.'
179
Despite its origins in the 1870s and continued viability, uniform
state legislation was one of the progressives' distinctive contribu-
tions to reform. Whereas the nineteenth century was character-
ized by state legislation and the New Deal by national legislation,
the Progressive era represented a compromise, tied to the past yet
anticipating the future. 8 '
The progressives marked a shift from the Founders' constitution of rights, aided by
"competitive federalism," toward a constitution of powers, aided by "cooperative
federalism."' ' 8' Congress used its tax and spending powers to assist state govern-
ments by "grants in aid.' 81 2 In the 1910 and 1920s, these modest subsidies aided
state health, education, and transportation programs; during the New Deal they
extended to Social Security and health insurance; more recently they have acted as
blandishments to induce states to integrate schools or raise their drinking ages.'83
Many progressives came to embrace the expansion of national power only as a
last resort, in cases where the states had failed.'" 4 As the ardent federalist Calvin
Coolidge put it in 1925, "Without doubt, the reason for increasing demands on the
Federal government is that the states have not discharged their full duties.' 85
17 ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at 213 (1967); David Brian
Robertson, The Bias ofAmerican Federalism: The Limits of Welfare-State Development in
the Progressive Era, 1 J. POL'Y HIST. 261, 279 (1989).
178 Cf Sanford Levinson, Fan Letters, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1471, 1477-78 (1997) (book
review) (noting that Justice Frankfurter, a Wilsonian, opposed a constitutional amendment
to ban child labor on the grounds that child labor was a problem appropriately addressed at
the state level).
171 William Graebner, Federalism in the Progressive Era: A Structural Interpretation of
Reform, 64 J. AM. HIST. 331, 332, 346 (1977).
180 Id. at 332-33.
181 Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1, 2, 19 (1950).
182 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (discussing federal grants to minimize
infant mortality).
183 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
'84 See ROBERT HARRISON, CONGRESS, PROGRESSIVE REFORM, AND THENEW AMERICAN
STATE 126, 246-48 (2004).
185 Derthick & Dinan, supra note 169, at 89.
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Herbert Croly, who provided the substance of Roosevelt's "new nationalism"
program, maintained de Tocqueville's distinction between political and administra-
tive centralization'86 and preferred state to national reform efforts.' 87 Unlike
European reformers of the same period, American progressives "were ambivalent
about using the federal government as an agency of social reform," one historian
notes. 88 "[T]he tradition of American federalism did as much as any single factor
to shape the direction of progressive reform in the United States."' 189 In short, the
defense of localism constituted an important strand in progressivism.' 90
Along with socioeconomic experiments, the states continued to police morals.
The common cultural standards of nineteenth-century "Victorian moralism"'' con-
tinued the eighteenth-century idea that republican self-government depended on
individual self-government. 192 Late nineteenth-century Americans believed that the
state had a duty to help individuals to control themselves. 193 At the same time,
Victorian moralism was also modern."9 However radically contemporary culture
has rejected it, we should recall that "Victorian ideas represented a bold, democratic,
egalitarian alternative to traditional, hierarchical philosophies of society and govern-
ment."'1 95 The state acted vigorously against drunkenness, gambling, sexual vice,
and brutal sports. 196 It promoted religious observance, education, and family life. 97
Though less overtly religious than in the eighteenth century, Protestant assumptions
suffused these efforts and thus provided the source of fierce ethno-cultural and reli-
gious political conflict in the states.' 98 Gilded Age Americans resisted redistributionist
186 See George Carey, Who or What Killed the Philadelphia Constitution?, 36 TULSA L.J.
621, 635 (2001) (describing Croly's favor of "centralization of political authority at the
national level"); Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism in Progressive
Political Theory and the CommerceClause After Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 403, 419 (2002) (noting Croly's opposition of "too-violent centralization" on
the grounds that Americans are attached to their local political institutions).
187 Derthick & Dinan, supra note 169, at 91-93.
188 BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1915 TO 1945, at 25
(1983).
189 id.
190 Derthick & Dinan, supra note 169, at 91-93.
' ' Michael Les Benedict, Victorian Moralism and CivilLiberty in the Nineteenth-Century
United States, in THE CONsTITUTION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE: CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE 91, 92 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1992).
192 Id. at 104.
'9' Id. at 103-04.
194 Id. at 92.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 98.
197 Id. at 98-99.
'98 Robert Kelley, Ideology and Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon, 82 AM. HIST.
REv. 531, 547-48 (1977); see also PAUL KLEPPNER, THE CROSS OF CULTURE: A SOCIAL
ANALYSIS OF MIDWESTERN POLITICS, 1850-1900 (1970).
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or "welfare state" political economy in the belief that a free market rewarded
virtuous behavior and punished vice."9 Indeed, society needed to promote rigorous
adherence to moral and religious principles precisely because the economy was so
free - internal lawfulness must prevent the market from promoting moral license.
Thus a century ago, America evinced a relatively unregulated economy and a highly
regulated culture. The twentieth century commenced an inversion, introducing more
economic regulation and greater moral freedom.
IV. PROGRESSIVES AND THE RISE OF A NATIONAL POLICE POWER
It is not surprising that the first steps toward a "federal police power" and the
evisceration of dual federalism emerged as Congress tried to help the states in their
efforts at moral reform. In 1873, Congress, in the Comstock Act, made it a crime to
send "obscene" publications through the mail, which included contraceptive infor-
mation.2"0 Congress began to use its power to regulate interstate commerce and its
taxing power to supervise socioeconomic matters traditionally left to the states. In
1895 it made it a crime to transport lottery tickets across state lines - even into states
where lotteries were not illegal.2" 1 The Supreme Court upheld the act by a 5-4 vote.
202
As Chief Justice Fuller remarked in dissent, "To hold that Congress has general police
power would be to hold that it may accomplish objects not entrusted to the General
Government, and to defeat the operation of the Tenth Amendment ...""
Congress then imposed a prohibitive excise tax on colored oleomargarine -
ostensibly to help prevent its fraudulent sale as butter, as well as to reduce
competition for dairy farmers.20 4 While Chief Justice Marshall had said that the
Court would strike down acts of Congress that were "pretexts" for exercising un-
enumerated powers,2 5 the Court in McCray v. United States206 held that it could not
inquire into the motives of legislators, nor correct their abuse of the taxing power.2 °7
To do so would violate the separation of powers; adumbrating the doctrine of Garcia,
the Court held that federal encroachments on state power could only be remedied
by the political process.20 8 Other acts upheld by the Court struck at adulterated food
'9 BAILEY, supra note 163, at 68, 154; see also RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF
REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 11,315 (1955).
200 NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND FAMILY REPRO-
DUCTION IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 39-40 (1997).
201 Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 191, 28 Stat. 963.
202 Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
203 Id. at 365 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
204 The Oleomargarine Act of 1886, ch. 840,24 Stat. 209 (1886), amended by Act of May
9, 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-110, 32 Stat. 193.
205 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
206 195 U.S. 27 (1904) (three justices dissented without opinion).
207 Id.
20 Id. at 55.
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and drugs,2 9 narcotics,21 and prostitution ("white slavery")21' - all of which were
widely regarded as inherently obnoxious and outlawed in most or all states. Though
the Court denied that it was yielding to a "federal police power," there seemed to be
no limits to Congress' power to regulate. As Justice McKenna wrote in a
unanimous decision upholding the White Slave Act, "If the statute be a valid
exercise of [the interstate commerce] power, how it may affect persons or States is
not material to be considered.,
212
The Court finally began to set limits to the federal police power when Congress
enacted a prohibition on interstate shipment of goods made by children under the
age of fourteen. 2 3 Along with slavery and segregation, child labor is one of the
most notorious abuses upon which the black legend of American federalism rests.
Progressives were "increasingly distraught at the ordeal of nearly two million children
employed in brutalizing slaughter houses ankle deep in blood, water, and refuse. 214
In fact, nearly three-quarters of child workers were farm hands, who would be
unaffected by the act.215 Most states already had child-labor laws,216 but North
Carolina prohibited labor by children under the age of twelve, rather than fourteen.21 7
Moreover, many contemporaries, and a few today, doubted that child labor laws did
more good than harm to children since, unpleasant as factory work might be, it was
often preferable to the next available alternative. 218 Having already accepted de
facto a federal police power under the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Court
rendered an unusually strained decision to strike down the Act.219 It distinguished
not just between commerce and manufacturing, but between products that were
inherently harmful and the means by which they were produced.2" Finally, Justice
Day effectively rewrote the Tenth Amendment along Jeffersonian, confederal lines,
saying, "In interpreting the Constitution it must never be forgotten that the Nation is
2"9 Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (sustaining the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768).
210 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
21 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the White Slave Traffic Act
of 1910, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825).
212 Id. at 320.
213 Child Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 64-249, 39 Stat. 675 (1916).
214 Leuchtenburg, supra note 23, at 44.
215 Bill Kauffman, The Child Labor Amendment Debate of the 1920s; or, Catholics and
Mugwumps and Farmers, 10 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 139, 142 (1992).
216 Graebner, supra note 179, at 353-54 ("As of 1909, almost all states.., had fourteen-
year age limits.").
217 Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387,
1430 (1987).
218 HARRISON, supra note 184, at 138-39, 244; Epstein, supra note 217, at 1431.
219 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled in part by United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 657 (1941).
220 Id. at 271-72.
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made up of States to which are entrusted the powers of local government. And to
them and to the people the powers not expressly delegated to the National Govern-
ment are reserved."22' The Court also struck down Congress's imposition of a
prohibitive tax on goods manufactured by child labor, this time by an 8-1 margin.222
Resistance to national child labor prohibition continued into the 1920s. North
Carolina mill owners were only minor obstacles compared to the array of ethnic, cul-
tural, and religious groups that fought against a child labor constitutional amendment.223
When Congress sent a proposed amendment to the states, "a fresh coalition assembled:
the Catholic Church, farmers, anti-feminists, Northern Mugwumps. . ., and ordinary
families afraid of the encroachment of the state and childless do-gooders." '224 Various
minority groups saw the amendment as part of the nativist swell of the postwar years,
which had prohibited foreign-language instruction in Nebraska, 5 private schooling in
Oregon, 6 and alcoholic beverages nationally. 7 Here federalism helped limit what
could be regarded as the underside or "sordid history" of progressivism itself.
The final crisis between dual federalism and the commerce clause, and the reso-
lution of American ambivalence about the extent of federal power in the economy,
came with the Great Depression. Congress had entered into the field of national
regulation with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.228 There was little question
that railroads were engaged in interstate commerce, and the Supreme Court had
stopped state regulation that interfered with them.229 The Court accepted the Act, and
gradually Congress's power over the railroads increased, until they were effectively
nationalized by 1920.230 The national effort to regulate large-scale manufacturers,
commonly known as "trusts," sparked more controversy. 3 The progressives claimed
that the Court had eviscerated the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890232 by distinguishing
"manufacture" from "commerce," as well as "direct" and "indirect" effects on inter-
state commerce, in the 1895 sugar trust case.233 But this decision adhered to the con-
temporary understanding of the commerce power and reflected the widespread view
221 Id. at 275 (quotingLane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71,76 (1869) ("[T]o [the
States] and to the people all powers not expressly delegated to the national government are
reserved.")).
222 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
223 Kauffman, supra note 215, at 157.
224 Id.
225 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (overturning Nebraska Law).
226 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (overturning Oregon law).
227 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
228 Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
229 See, e.g., Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
230 ALBRO MARTIN, ENTERPRISE DENIED: ORIGINS OF THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN
RAILROADS, 1897-1917, at 363--64 (1971).
231 Seeid. at 115.
232 Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
233 See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895).
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of dual federalism. 3  The decision preserved state power to act against monopolies.235
The states chose not to act, reflecting the widespread ambivalence of the American
people about big business - the desire to enjoy their obvious economic advantages,
alongside fears and suspicions about their power.236
During the 1920s, the Supreme Court continued to maintain an uneasy balance
between state and national power and between state power and individual rights. Like
the postwar Republican political branches, the Court did assist in the containment of
progressive innovations but also accepted quite a few.237 This ambivalence continued
into the early years of the New Deal. The great political crisis that culminated in
President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan did not develop until 1935-1936, when the
Court seemed to turn sharply against the New Deal. It accepted, for example,
Roosevelt's national "bank holiday'2 3 and Congress's subsequent devaluation of the
currency,2 39 and the Tennessee Valley Authority.240 It also accepted state debtor-relief
laws of a kind that it had traditionally struck down as impairing the obligation of
contracts, 41 and price-fixing laws that infringed the liberty of contract.242 But it struck
down state minimum wage laws,243 creating what President Roosevelt called a "'no-
man's-land,' where no Government - State or Federal - can function." 2"
Congress's attempts to coordinate industrial and agricultural production posed
deeper problems. The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)245 and Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA)246 proposed to use Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce to limit production, raise prices, and limit competition in what
amounted to federally-enforced cartels. The Court struck down these acts, 247 along
234 See Epstein, supra note 217, at 1400.
235 E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 13.
236 KELLY ETAL., supra note 42, at 380; see also ELLIS HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE
PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STuDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1966).
237 KELLY ET AL., supra note 42, at 443-45.
238 Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of Terrorism and
Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global Philanthropy,
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1356 (2004) (describing the circumstances surrounding
President Roosevelt's declaration of the "bank holiday").
239 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
240 Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
241 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
242 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
243 Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
244 The Three Hundredth Press Conference, June 2, 1936, excerpted in 5 THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OFFRANKLIND. ROOSEVELT 191, 192 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938).
245 Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
246 Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
7 U.S.C.).
247 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (striking down the AAA); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (declaring parts of the NIRA unconsti-
tutional).
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with similar statutes in the petroleum 2 48 and coal industries, 2 49 by large majorities.
Federalism - the limits of the commerce power and the reservation of state powers
under the Constitution - provided only one of the grounds for voiding these acts.
Excessive delegation of legislative power to the President and private interest groups
figured more prominently; as Justice Cardozo, among the most liberal justices, put
it, "This is delegation running riot."25 The decision striking down NIRA was
unanimous;251 that striking down the petroleum code under NIRA was 8-1 .252 The
decisions striking down the AAA253 and Bituminous Coal Conservation Act,254 more
squarely based on federalist grounds, were 6-3 and 5-4 respectively, but it is clear
that Justice Brandeis dissented reluctantly in Butler.255 He rejoiced when the Court
struck down the NIRA.256 Reflecting the old progressive suspicion of concentrated
government power, Brandeis told one of Roosevelt's advisers to "tell the President
that we're not going to let this government centralize everything. It's come to an
end. 2 57 He told the New Dealers "to go home, back to the states. That is where
they must do their work., 25
8
But the New Dealers remained in Washington and succeeded in getting the
Court to accept the "second New Deal": legislation more carefully crafted that accom-
plished first New Deal goals in a piecemeal fashion.259 The Court began to abandon
the two chief doctrinal limitations on government power: substantive due process
or liberty of contract, which restrained the states, and dual federalism, which con-
tained the federal government. 260 Historians have largely discarded the interpre-
tation of the Court's volte-face in 1937-1938 as the aftermath of Roosevelt's pro-
posal to pack the Supreme Court. It is now quite clear that the Court's swing voters,
Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts, did not alter their opinions in response to
the Court-packing plan or even the 1936 election results. 26 1 Both had been ambivalent
248 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
249 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
250 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 495 (majority opinion).
252 Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. 388.
253 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
254 Carter, 298 U.S. 238.
255 MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL
WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 133 (2002).
256 Id. at 104 ("Justice Brandeis... stat[ed] publicly, [the day Schechter was decided] was
the most important day in the history of the Supreme Court and the most beneficient."
(quoting ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 620 (1946)).
257 PHILIPPA STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 352 (1984).
258 Id.
259 Claeys, supra note 186, at 427.
260 The leading cases were West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
261 Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes
Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1896 (1994).
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progressives all along. There was no "switch in time that saved nine. ,262 Thus there
is little historical basis for claims such as those of Justice Souter, who warned that
the new federalism decisions of the 1990s "ignor[e] the painful lesson learned in
1937" and revive an "old juridical pretension discredited and abandoned in 193 7. ' '263
But the Court's abandonment of dual federalism was nevertheless revolutionary.
The 1937 cases might have represented nothing more than a return to an earlier pro-
gressive position by Justices Hughes and Roberts, but, as Roosevelt filled vacancies
on the conservative wing of the Court, federal ambivalence was entirely swept away.
In 1941, the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act, which established a national
minimum wage and finally abolished child labor.264 As Justice Stone noted, "Our
conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment .... The amendment states but
a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. 265 With all economic
activity understood as "commerce," the truism became a dead letter. In 1942 the
Court upheld a fine against an Ohio farmer who grew more wheat than he was
allotted under the revised Agricultural Adjustment Act, despite the fact that he used
the wheat only for home consumption, animal feed, and seed.2 6 The Court would
not strike down any act of Congress as beyond its interstate commerce power until
the 1990S. 2 67 As one standard account concludes, the New Deal "revolutionized the
federal system and went far toward displacing the regime of the framers., 268
At first glance, the New Deal Court seemed to restore state power, no longer
using the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit economic regulation. But Congress's
unlimited authority under the commerce, taxing, and general welfare clauses pre-
empted the states and increasingly turned them into administrative subdivisions of
the national bureaucracy.269 Nor did this centralization of policymaking always
promote "progressive" ends. While the laissez-faire Court used the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down state minimum-wage laws, 270 a Congress unrestrained
by the Tenth Amendment established a national maximum-wage policy and pro-
hibited a state from raising the wages of its own employees.27'
While the Supreme Court appeared to be chastened in its acceptance of the New
Deal and to adopt a policy of self-restraint, it actually shifted its activism from the
economic sphere into the moral, cultural, and religious arena. This shift undermined
262 BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTI-
TUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); KELLY ET AL., supra note 42, at 488.
263 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 609, 614 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
264 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
265 Id. at 123-24.
266 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
267 KELLY ET AL., supra note 42, at 683.
268 Id. at 467.
269 Id. at 500; cf Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling
of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 484 (1997).
270 See, e.g., Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
271 Fryv. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
state power even more profoundly than the empowerment of Congress in the eco-
nomic realm. The Court signaled this development in a footnote to a decision in
which it upheld a congressional prohibition of "filled milk." '272 The Court would
henceforth assume that Congress had good reasons for controlling "ordinary commer-
cial transactions." '273 But Justice Stone noted, "There may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within
the Fourteenth." '274 The Court would pay special attention to the workings of the
political process; to "statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial
minorities"; and also be alert to "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
[which] may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." '275 In short,
the Court would only protect non-property rights.
The Fourteenth Amendment provided the basis for this restriction on traditional
state power to police welfare and morals. This was not altogether new; the pre-New
Deal Court used the amendment to protect the rights of blacks and other minorities
in property and non-property related cases.276 The particular doctrine that did the
most to impose national standards on state policy in matters of civil rights and
liberties, the application or "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights to the states, is
usually regarded as having begun in 1925.277 But World War II and the early Cold
War made the American public and the Court more willing to sacrifice individual
liberties to the needs of national security, so the "rights revolution" did not begin in
earnest until the late 1950s and especially the 1960s, the heyday of the Warren Court.
Much of the judicial leadership in the rights revolution derived from the Court's
bold step against racial segregation in the Brown v. Board of Education decision.278
Moreover, segregationists' resort to the Tenth Amendment and states' rights cemented
progressive-liberal faith in national power and severely discredited federalism. Some
of the most significant judicial steps to curb state power occurred when the Court re-
quired "one person, one vote" in legislative districts,279 prohibited school prayer and
272 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
273 Id. at 152.
274 Id. at 152 n.4.
275 Id. at 153 n.4.
276 JOHN BRAEMAN, BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: THE OLD COURT AND INDIVI-
DUAL RIGHTS (1988).
277 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating the First Amendment).
278 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
279 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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generally limited religious expression in public life,28° and nearly prohibited capital
punishment.28" ' It dismantled nearly the entire regime of "Victorian moralism," strik-
ing down laws against obscenity and pornography,282 contraception, 283 and abortion.24
It imposed nearly all of the criminal procedure guarantees of the Bill of Rights upon
the states.285 The Court struck down more state laws in the 1960s than it had federal
laws through its entire history.286 In short, the states became nearly as bereft of power
in the moral-cultural sphere as they had become in the socioeconomic sphere.
By the 1970s and 1980s, cultural and intellectual reaction against the centraliza-
tion of American society had become a strong force. Indeed, it was implicit in the
calls for "participatory democracy" on the radical left in the 1960s. 2 7 But the
liberation movements had too much at stake in national institutions, especially the
federal judiciary, to embrace constitutional devolution. On the right, a feeling arose
that the American people were losing or had lost the habit of self-government nec-
essary to sustain republicanism. "Communitarians" bemoaned the weakening of
"civil society" amid widespread anomie, atomization, and alienation.288 Politically,
they worried about low voter turnout and general electoral apathy. The New Deal
welfare state and permissive cultural mores removed the need for individual self-
government.289 On the other side of the "culture war," liberals cheered the end of
repressive Victorian moralism along with the end of the pre-New Deal, laissez-faire
political economy.29
280 Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
28. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
282 KELLY ET AL., supra note 42, at 629-30.
283 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (plurality opinion); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
28 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
285 RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES (198 1).
286 Keith E. Whittington, The Casey Five Versus the Federalism Five: Supreme Legislator
or Prudent Umpire?, in THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL, supra note 160, at 181, 182.
287 See Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society (1962), available
at http://www.vtcampuscompact.org/downloadable%20documents/porthuron.pdf (last
visited Dec. 1, 2005).
288 DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRmCS (1993); ROBERT N. BELLAH ET
AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985);
BRUCE FROHNEN, THENEW COMMUNITARIANS AND THE CRISIS OF MODERN LIBERALISM (1996).
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Perspective, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 109.
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Insofar as the Burger and Rehnquist courts challenged judicial centralization of
civil rights and civil liberties - curtailing affirmative action 9' or abortion rights,292
for example - these can be seen as part of the "new federalism" constitutional
devolution. But there is, if anything, even less of a pattern here than in the restric-
tion of Congress's commerce power; since 1969 the Court sustained and extended
Warren Court doctrine in these areas.2 93 The weakening of federalism - in Tenth
Amendment terms, depriving states of powers that were not prohibited to them by
the Constitution - continued even as the "new federalism" began to limit con-
gressional power. In New Deal jargon, moral-cultural liberty, and sexual liberty in
particular, composed a "no man's land" regulatable by neither federal nor state
governments. As the Court put it when upholding the right to abortion, "At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life."294 Or, in libertarian terms of the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments, they are natural rights retained by the people. In short,
there was, in the realm of culture, no Court counterrevolution equivalent to the "new
federalism."
CONCLUSION
This alternative history shows that federalism has been a content-neutral prin-
ciple to which both liberals and conservatives have appealed. It remains true today,
despite the common view in academe and the national media that the "new federal-
ism" is an inherently conservative movement.' Some on the left have begun to
recognize this. In the 1980s, when the federal courts began to rein in their broad
reading of the Bill of Rights, many civil libertarian activists counseled a move
toward state judiciaries and state bills of rights.296 The movement for homosexual
marriage has depended on state court action (in Hawaii,297 Vermont, 298 and most
especially Massachusetts 299), and opposes the nationalization of the question by
statute or amendment. Gay rights advocates defended aNew Jersey law that required
the Boy Scouts to accept openly homosexual scout masters, and the dissenting
291 E.g., Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
292 E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
293 Mark V. Tushnet, On the Rehnquist Court, Everyone Has Been a Judicial Activist,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 26, 2004, at B9. This is a prfcis of Tushnet's book, A COURT
DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW (2005).
294 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (plurality opinion).
295 Nina Morrison, Note, Curing "Constitutional Amnesia": Criminal Procedure Under
State Constitutions, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 880, 884-85 (1998).
29' William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill ofRights and the States: The Revival of State Consti-
tutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986).
297 Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996).
298 Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
299 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
[Vol. 14:711
"So LONG AS OUR SYSTEM SHALL EXIST"
liberal wing of the Court asserted Tenth Amendment principles a.30 "The Calhoun/
Wallace perspective of States' Rights was advanced in the Boy Scouts case in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens, in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joined," a federal judge wryly noted."0 ' In the litigation involving the 2000
presidential election, conservatives were embarrassed that Supreme Court activism
stopped the Florida recount,30 2 while "the Calhoun/Wallace perspective of States'
Rights was advanced by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Bush v. Gore.,303
The federalization of criminal law means that, in states that prohibit the death
penalty or never impose it, the death penalty is more likely to be executed.30" "Trial
lawyers" who seek state courts that are more likely to grant large damage awards in
tort cases also have a stake in federalism. 305 This is one of the reasons that many on
the libertarian right are suspicious of federalism. 36 And many pro-federalism con-
servatives are uneasy about the assertion of judicial activism that accompanies the
"new federalism. 30 7 Like federalism, judicial review is also a content-neutral prin-
ciple that has been used by both left and right in American history.
Perhaps the most obvious example of the ironic cross-currents of federalism is
in the controversial area of abortion. In 2003, Congress used its commerce power
to prohibit "partial-birth abortion. ,308 The act imposes penalties on "[a]ny physician
who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly performs a partial-
300 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 678-85 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
301 William H. Pryor, Jr., Madison's Double Security: In Defense of Federalism, the
Separation of Powers, and the Rehnquist Court, 53 ALA. L. REv. 1167, 1176 (2002).
302 Michael C. Dorf, Book Survey, The 2000 Presidential Election: Archetype or
Exception?, 99MICH. L. REv. 1279, 1291 (2001) ("[N]either the initial stay nor the ultimate
disposition in Bush v. Gore was conservative in the conventional sense. By contrast, some
of the Court's most activist, conservative decisions have actually frustrated the institutional
interests of the Republican Party.").
303 Pryor, supra note 301, at 1177 (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123-29 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
31 William Yardley, Where Execution Feels Like Relic, Death Looms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
21, 2004, at 1.
305 Jeffrey Rosen, Fed Up, NEW REPUBLIC, May 22, 1995, at 13.
306 CLINT BOLICK, GRASSROOTS TYRANNY: THE LIMITS OF FEDERALISM (1993).
307 Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: JudicialReview Under the Commerce Clause,
74 TEx. L. REv. 719, 720, 727 (1996) (endorsing Justice Blackmun's Garcia principle of
judicial withdrawal from federalism issues); cf Christopher Wolfe, The Rehnquist Court and
"Conservative Judicial Activism," in THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL, supra note 160, at 217.
Social liberals unsuccessfully sought to protect states' rights to permit the prescription of
marijuana for medical purposes, over the prohibitions of federal drug laws, in a decision that
underlines the tenuous nature of the federalism revival. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct.
2195 (2005); The New Federalism: Liberals Discover States' Rights, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5,
2005, at A20.
30 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1531).
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birth abortion and thereby kills a human fetus.,,3 ' The justices who oppose abortion
rights are also the principal "new federalism" authors. As much as they might
approve of a prohibition of partial-birth abortion, it is very unlikely that they will
sustain this act on commerce clause grounds. At the same time, the California
Attorney General is suing to overturn an act of Congress that threatens to cut off
federal funds for states that compel insurers, physicians, and hospitals to provide and
perform abortions. 310 "This is an unacceptable attack on women's rights and state
sovereignty," he said.3
This bipartisan appeal to states' rights is in keeping with the varied and rich
history of American federalism, not with the one-sided black legend. History is well
served by the viewpoint of an old progressive historian who noted that federalism
"must always be studied in its relation to time and circumstances. The state rights
doctrine has never had any real vitality independent of underlying conditions of vast
social, economic or political significance. '31 2 It seems likely that, as John Marshall
put it, the federalism debate will continue "so long as our system shall exist., 313
o9 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a).
3' Bob Egelko, Lockyer to Suefor Abortion Rights, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 9, 2004, at B3.
311 Id.
312 SCHLESINGER, supra note 80, at 243.
"' McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
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